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DOCUMENT NO. 1

NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☒

☐ DECLASSIFIED

CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C

NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010

AUTH: HQ 73-2

DATE: 5 JUN 1980

REVIEWER: ☐

2 November 1959

Copy No. C 65

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



DOE/DOS review(s) completed.

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Approved For Release 2004/12/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004800010001-7

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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

2 November 1959

### DAILY BRIEF

#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

OK [ ]  
USSR: Khrushchev in his speech to the Supreme Soviet on 31 October reaffirmed his preference for a summit conference as early as possible. In proposing an agenda, he assigned top priority to disarmament and also listed a German peace treaty, Berlin, and other questions. The speech reflected an effort to meet reservations apparently expressed by other bloc leaders regarding the effects of present Soviet policy. In a passage probably addressed primarily to Chinese Communist leaders, he repeated earlier doctrine that "one must not confuse mutual concessions in the interest of peaceful coexistence" with ideological concessions. He also warned against "adventurism in politics."

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NO [ ]  
East Germany - USSR: Differences of opinion continue to be reported between East German leaders and Khrushchev over China. Both Ulbricht and Premier Grotewohl look favorably on Chinese hard-line practices, some features of which have been applied in East Germany. [ ]

#### II. ASIA-AFRICA

OK [ ]  
Laos: The Laotian Government has again postponed the trial of Prince Souphannouvong and 13 other pro-Communist leaders, from 2 November until after 13 November. Inadequate security arrangements was given as the reason for this second postponement. The Communists may claim credit for the delay. During the past week Peiping and Moscow have charged that the trial would block a settlement through "peaceful negotiation" and aggravate tension in the area. [ ]

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Afghanistan-Pakistan: High Pakistani Air Force officers have stated that on several occasions in recent weeks formations of Afghan IL-28 bombers have flown over Pakistani territory. Such overflights, the first indication of regular operations by Afghanistan's Soviet-equipped bomber force, seem almost certain to provoke eventual Pakistani reaction if they are continued. An Afghan-Pakistani clash would upset present efforts to ease the long-tense state of relations between the two countries.

OK

Belgian Congo: Serious nationalist disorders on 30 and 31 October spread for the first time beyond the coastal area when a violent clash took place between Belgian troops and native Africans at Stanleyville. The violence, which reportedly did extensive damage and claimed at least 24 lives, occurred after government forces attempted to disperse an unauthorized meeting of the Congo Nationalist Movement (MNC) independence group. The MNC recently rejected Belgian plans for gradual Congolese independence. Although order had been restored in Stanleyville by 1 November, the arrest of the MNC leader on that date may be expected to lead to further trouble.

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France-Algeria: The announcement by Delegate General Delouvrier in Algeria on 30 October that a two-stage referendum will be required when Algerians exercise self-determination, as promised by De Gaulle, is viewed as a step backwards by proponents of a liberal Algerian solution. Delouvrier's "clarification" of De Gaulle's proposals, presumably made on orders from Paris, was probably intended to meet reported army dissatisfaction with De Gaulle's Algerian policy.

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*bK* Bolivia: The situation in Bolivia is tense and likely to remain so in the period before the presidential nominating convention of the government party which is scheduled to open on 10 December. Civilian militia groups are being mobilized in support of the conflicting presidential ambitions of both former President Paz--whom moderate President Siles is apparently now supporting--and right-wing leader Walter Guevara. The police and the army are said to have been alerted to quell disturbances, but they probably could not control a widespread outbreak on the part of the militia.

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DAILY BRIEF

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## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

### Khrushchev's Foreign Policy Speech

In his speech to the closing session of the Supreme Soviet on 31 October, Khrushchev summarized in a notably moderate tone the principal themes of his "peaceful coexistence" policy which he developed during and since his visit to the United States. He indicated satisfaction with the "noticeable improvement in the international situation" and said the prospects for strengthening peace "have become more favorable."

Khrushchev's discussion of major East-West questions contained no indication of any changes in the Soviet position. He repeated his favorable assessment of his US visit and talks with President Eisenhower and attempted to convey the impression that he had reached "mutual understanding" with both the President and Prime Minister Macmillan on a summit conference. While he avoided direct criticism of President de Gaulle's position on the timing of a meeting, he rejected the view that the heads of government should meet only after agreement has been reached on major questions. He reaffirmed his preference for an early meeting and proposed an agenda which gave top priority to disarmament, followed by a German peace treaty, Berlin, and "other international questions of general interest."

Khrushchev expressed Soviet appreciation of the statements by De Gaulle and Premier Debré on the "inviolability" of the Oder-Neisse frontier. He gave a cautious endorsement to De Gaulle's recent statement on Algeria but, at the same time, repeated the standard expression of Soviet sympathy for peoples who are "struggling for independence and national liberty."

In Moscow's first authoritative response to recent statements by American officials holding the USSR at least partially responsible for Peiping's actions, Khrushchev denounced this as a "psychological attack against the Soviet Union" and accused the United States of distorting the character of Sino-Soviet relations and

casting doubt on Peiping's sovereignty. He repeated Moscow's view that the Taiwan question is a "purely internal affair of China" and expressed confidence that "Taiwan and the other islands will be reunited with the rest of China." Although he made no mention of the use of force, Khrushchev renewed Soviet pledges to support Peiping "until it has achieved settlement of this question."

The Soviet premier adhered to his neutral position on the Sino-Indian border dispute, expressing hope for a peaceful settlement satisfactory to both sides. The New China News Agency's account of the speech omitted this passage.

The most important aspect of Khrushchev's speech was his effort to define the limits of his peaceful coexistence policy--presumably in response to doubts and reservations which apparently have been voiced by other bloc leaders. After urging the need in the present world situation for "mutual concessions and understanding" in East-West relations, he emphasized that "one must not confuse mutual concessions in the interest of peaceful coexistence" with concessions on ideological principles, which he said are out of the question.

Khrushchev defended his present course by pointing out that Soviet history contains many examples of "Lenin's wise and flexible foreign policy aimed at the solution of vital problems of peace." In a passage apparently addressed primarily to the Chinese Communists, he recalled Trotsky's opposition to Lenin's decision to make peace with Germany in 1918 "to ensure for the young Soviet state the possibility of peaceful construction of socialism," and said Trotsky's "adventurist" policy had "played into the hands of the German imperialists."

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## II. ASIA-AFRICA

### Afghan Air Force Bombers Overfly Pakistani Territory

The commander in chief of the Pakistani Air Force on 28 October stated that formations of Afghan twin-jet bombers, presumably IL-28s, had recently appeared along the Afghan-Pakistani border and that on one occasion three aircraft of a flight of 12 had overflowed the border. On the same day, a senior Pakistani Air Force officer in Peshawar stated that 10 or 12 times during the past few weeks formations of Afghan IL-28 jet bombers had overflowed Pakistani tribal territory south of the Khyber Pass. This officer said the Pakistani Air Force was asking for anti-aircraft artillery to be installed in the area to deal with future intrusions.

Continued Afghan overflights of Pakistani territory seem almost certain eventually to stimulate Pakistani military reaction, either in the form of anti-aircraft fire or fighter interception. An Afghan-Pakistani clash would nullify efforts now being made in diplomatic circles to bring about a rapprochement between Karachi and Kabul.

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Tension Increasing in Bolivia

Tension is likely to increase in Bolivia as a result of mobilization of civilian militia in support of the conflicting presidential ambitions of former President Paz and right-wing leader Walter Guevara. Moderate President Siles has apparently swung his support from Guevara to Paz, and this is likely to give the preponderance of militia support to Paz. The outcome of the present conflict is likely to have decisive importance for the presidential nominating convention of the government party scheduled to open 10 December. This nomination is tantamount to election since the party has no major opposition in Bolivia.

In an apparent move to placate Guevara's right-wing supporters, Siles has demanded that leftist Jose Rojas, a principal leader of the rural militia, resign from the cabinet by 4 November. Rojas' dismissal may provoke additional militia violence, however, since he is now mobilizing his supporters while another key rural militia leader is mobilizing opposing units.

The police and the army are said to have been placed on the alert to quell disturbances, but they probably could not control a widespread outbreak of militia violence. [REDACTED]

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